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Abstract
Economic rent is defined as excessive financial returns made possible by control or
monopoly over a particular market. A minority of economists suggest that we live in an
era of “rentier capitalism” characterized by exploitative extreme wealth. Their arguments
are framed in new and powerful ways, but their focus has a long heritage, flowing back to
classical economists such as Adam Smith who criticized the wealthy for reaping “where
they never sowed.” While interest in rentierism is growing, other economists, including
on the left, disagree that rentier gains underpin most extreme fortunes today. I introduce
the concept of “ignorance pathways” to raise new points about the perceptual divide
between those who “see” rent and those who do not. Mapping different ignorance
pathways within modern economic thought, I theorize the reasons for why rentier
returns remain “unseen”. Terminology is policy: it is harder to make a policy case for
redistributing rentier returns when the contentious object of scrutiny — in this case
“rent”— is believed to be something that does not exist.
Keywords: Rentier Capitalism; Economic Inequality; Exploitation; Ignorance Studies;
Billionaires.
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1 Introduction
I don’t see anyone on the [Forbes 400] list whose ancestors bought a great parcel
of land in 1780 and have been accumulating family wealth by collecting rents ever
since. (Bill Gates, 2014)
I don’t look at the world today and see that the commanding heights of capitalist
power are occupied by rentiers or passive rent extractors. (J.W. Mason, 2021a)
You have probably heard of the first person quoted above: Bill Gates doesn’t need an intro-
duction. The second quote is from an economist known in academic circles, but less so outside
of them. J.W. Mason is a left-wing economist who works at City University of New York, and
who has a popular blog breaking down some of his important work in macroeconomics. He
supports valuable socialist causes, contributing articles to the left-wing US magazine Jacobin
with headings such as “Why college should be free;” “Why rent controlworks,” and “KarlMarx
and the corporation.” But when it comes to a topic that preoccupied classical economists in
the eighteenth and nineteenth century — the question of how much wealth is “productively”
earned, versus how much accrued from rentier gains — Mason’s position aligns closely with
that of Bill Gates. As the quotes above indicate, they agree that “rent” is not a major source of
wealth concentration today. Other people disagree with them.
Albeit with nuanced differences among their arguments, a growing number of scholars
insist that rentier gains do underpin the fortune of billionaires like Gates (Christophers, 2020;
Hudson, 2011 & 2014; Piketty, 2014; Mazzucato, 2018). My aim is not to establish who is
“right”. Indeed, one of my arguments is that definitive, incontestable answers on either side
might be impossible, because categories such as “rentier extraction” and “unearned wealth”
are descriptive, mutable classifications, rendered more “real” as a result of legal, political, and
disciplinary shifts that havemade rentiersmore apparent in some sectors and eras than in others.
Like children riding on a carousel, the visibility of rents dip in and out of sight depending
on statistical measurements and disciplinary axioms that make the problem more apparent at
different times.
This article tracks the phenomenon of disappearing and reappearing rent over a 200-year
period. This historical scope is useful for a few reasons. First, it helps to correct a tendency
in some recent studies in economic sociology to make untenable assumptions about the nine-
teenth century, including the claim thatwhat distinguishes neoliberalism is the active use of the
state to subsidize and steermarket activities. Such analyses neglect the fact that western govern-
mentswere also interventionist in the nineteenth century, a periodwrongly seen as a timewhen
the market was more “disembedded” than it really was (Stahl, 2019; Watson, 2018; McGoey,
2019). Second, the scope illuminates a historical shift central to understanding why “rentier”
wealth ceased to be a primary focus of neoclassical economists over the twentieth century: the
marginal turn in theories of economic value and economic productivitywhich entrenched new
understandings of income distribution.
Studies have shown how the marginal turn led to a major paradigm shift in the twenti-
eth century onwards: labour theories of value subscribed to by classical economists such as
Smith, Ricardo andMarx were replaced, inmainstream economic theory, by “subjective” theo-
ries of incomedistribution influenced by JohnBatesClark and othermarginalist thinkers. This
shift occurred despite even right-leaning economists such as Frank Knight and Joseph Schum-
peter perceiving severe problems with Clark’s formulation, namely that it side-lines the role of
both luck and the law in benefiting some individuals and groups over others (McGoey, 2017;
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Schumpeter, 1972[1954]). The marginalist turn’s implications when it comes to labour theo-
ries of value have been noted across the social sciences (Mazzucato, 2018), but more attention
is needed to how changing understanding of economic value relate to disciplinary and public
perceptions of the existence of economic rent.
I argue that despite recent interest in rentierism from heterodox and mainstream
economists, these studies are the exception. The common tendency today is to restrict rent
to financial rents. This cleanses fortunes made through, for example, retail sales at companies
such as Amazon of the type of moral disrepute that earlier classical economists associated with
land monopolies and usury. Other studies have called attention to the political economic
origins of rentier power today (Arboleda & Purcell, 2021; Birch, 2019; Birch & Cochrane,
2021; Christophers, 2020), as well as moral implications of the rise of rentiers who “extract”
rather than adding value to society (Mazzucato, 2018; Sayer, 2014, 2020). But this previous
work does not focus on the epistemological points that I raise.
The structure is as follows. First, I survey recentwork on “rentier capitalism” fromChristo-
phers and others who argue that rentier extraction is a real but underexamined reality of cap-
italist exchange today. Then I examine the opposite view from economists on both the right
and left who suggest that “rentierism” is rarer than scholars such as Christophers claim, pro-
viding context to Mason’s comment in the epigraph above, where he —- much like Bill Gates
—- suggests that rentier gains are not a central feature of the “commanding heights” of wealth
accumulation today. My last section introduces the concept of “ignorance pathways”, defined
as socio-historical mappings of how a phenomenon came to be imperceptible or ignorable in
the present, to theorize the origins and social implications of this perceptual divide.
2 Seeing Rent
In economics teaching and mainstream research, economic rents are broadly defined as an ex-
cess of payment to the owner of a factor of production above the cost needed to bring that
factor into use of production. This definition, while succinct at first glance, raises key deeper
questions that lie at the heart of ongoing social sciences debates over the pervasiveness of rentier
gains. Different elements make rent a nebulous phenomenon: including 1) determining what
is an “excessive” payment, and 2) extricating and delineating which political resources are most
instrumental, including patents and other political entitlements, in enabling exclusive owner-
ship of an asset. Bringing these political elements into clearer focus has been a key goal of recent
work of rentierism from political economists who have added nuance to the general definition
above. Christophers, for example, defines rent as: “income derived from the ownership, posses-
sion or control of scarce assets under conditions of limited or no competition” (Christophers,
2020, p. xxiv; Standing, 2016, offers a similar definition).
Christophers emphasizes that “like all important economic concepts, ‘rent’ is blurred at
the margins. There is no cut-and-dried distinctions” (2020, p. xxv). This blurriness has led
different economists to emphasize different conceptions of rent in different periods. Keynes,
for example, treats rent as a mostly financial phenomenon, primarily derived from financial
speculation in global markets. This treatment led him to suggest in his General Theory of Em-
ployment, Interest and Money (1935) that the state could and should take stronger control of
different types of private financing (Watkins, 2010; McGoey, 2018). He thought a state-led
system could battle problems such as usury, leading eventually to the “euthanasia of the ren-
tier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to
exploit the scarcity-value of capital” (Keynes, 2017[1935], p. 326). As Pettifor (2008) points
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out, Keynes was critical of financial rentierism because, much like the problem of land rents
and absentee landlord entitlements that worried classical economists, it “rewards no genuine
sacrifice, any more than does the rent of land”.
Keynes’s phrase “scarcity-value” is the key for understanding amajor shift that took place in
attitudes to rent over the nineteenth century and into the early decades of the twentieth century.
Classical economists treated rent as chiefly linked to land rents, and thus generated when the
fixed supply of land conferred advantages on owners regardless of any effort by the owner. Dic-
tionaries and encyclopaedia definitions are a useful resource for understanding classical treat-
ments of rent because they offer a “consensus” understanding of mainstream attitudes in dif-
ferent eras. The current online Britannica entry for “rent”, for example, written by Boulding
et al. (1998), explains that for classical economists such as Smith “rent was the income derived
from the ownership of land and other natural resources in fixed supply.”1
Smith’s analysis is introduced in Volume 1 ofWealth of Nations (1997[1776]), where he
offers an influential perspective on land fertility and its effect on the supply and demand of
agricultural produce. Smith recognized that demand for agricultural produce led owners to ex-
ploit as much land as possible, cultivating even the most unpromising, least fertile land when
the expense of doing so was at least marginally covered by the prices that any produce could
command on the market. When it came to weaker land, the profit might be negligible: the
price might barely offset the expense and effort of having to coax out sellable produce from
comparatively arid, fruitless soil. But that price then conferred additional benefits for owner
when it came to their most fertile land, because the price differential there was much more
advantageous for them. The price achieved from weak land reflected “zero rent”, whereas, at
the other extreme, the most fertile land commanded the same price for a greater abundance
of produce, leading to higher rewards for owners — a “free gift of nature” despite no extra ef-
fort on their part (Boulding et al., 1998). Later, this “free gift” of nature would come to be
known in economics as “natural capital”, defined as “natural resources capable of producing a
surplus stock or profit without direct human intervention”— although without recent schol-
ars of natural capital necessarily tracing their definition to Smith’s earlier understanding of rent
(Wolloch, 2020; see also Battistoni, 2017).
The Britannica entry on “rent” is, understandably, a clinical, dispassionate assessment of
consensus views on rent in “classical” and “modern” economic thought. But the inclusion of
the phrase “free gift” is open to misinterpretation because it implies that classical economists
were neutral or even approving of the use of nature’s “gifts” for personal gain. But the op-
posite is true. Smith censured landowners inWealth of Nations, writing that as “soon as the
land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to
reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce” (1997[1776],
p. 47). Smith recognized, as did his contemporaries, including James Maitland, the eighth
Earl of Lauderdale (1759–1839), a distinction between private profits and public wealth that
later Marxist thinkers dubbed the “Lauderdale Paradox”, derived from Maitland’s book, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth and into the Means and Causes of its In-
crease (1804), whereMaitland argued that an increase of private fortunes tends to decrease the
wealth available to the general public (Clark & Foster, 2010). A similar concern underpins
Piketty’s 𝑟 > 𝑔 formula, which he uses to show that private returns to capital inmost advanced
1. The Britannica entry on “rent” is attributed to four authors—K. Boulding, P. Kleinsorge, O. Schmitt and J.
Pen, and with every refreshing of the webpage, different names appear to the reader as “first” author. I have
used “Boulding” in the in-text citation because he is the first author alphabetically. Last accessed April 2021.
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economics today are growing at much higher rates than overall national wealth, worsening in-
equality (Piketty, 2014).
Smith andhis immediate successors did not treat thewealth of nations as a “full-sum” game,
where privatewealth for some inevitably enriches awider polity. Ironically, pithy extracts about
the invisible hand are cherry-picked fromWealth of Nations today to insist that Smith did see
an intrinsic connection between private fortunes and public wealth, but any close reading of
Wealth of Nations leads to a far more nuanced conclusion (Norman, 2018; McGoey, 2019).
Smith was critical of usury, calling for ceilings on interest rates and government regulation of
extortionate lending, suggesting that he had a prescient, earlier awareness of the problem of
financial rentierism. But he largely focused on land rent, as opposed to later thinkers such as
Keynes who emphasized unearned gains from financial speculation.
In light of this historical shift, scholars such as Dirk Bezemer andMichael Hudson (2016)
suggest that a key goal of economics should be “capturing the specific forms that ‘unproduc-
tive’ revenues take in a particular era” (p. 752). Following the classical focus on land rents,
mid-twentieth century scholars like Keynes tended to emphasize rents from stockmarket spec-
ulation, while for Bezemer and Hudson, a key source of rentier wealth today is mortgage and
other types of household debt, something that has skyrocketed in the past half-century. This
approach to rent—which treats understanding of different types of rent in a sort of evolution-
ary way, with earlier classical attitudes to land rent seen as gradually expanding to include other
types of “unearned” income— has some explanatory advantages, discussed below. But it also
has epistemological limitations, discussed in my final section.
The main analytical advantage is that it underscores a key historical shift, which was the
realization that rents could be generated not simply from resources that were physically scarce,
like land, but also from resources that are made scarce to benefit private interests, including
through different types of intellectual property protection and other government licenses, a
problem that Henry George perceived with railroad contracts in the nineteenth century. This
led “institutional schools” of economic theory and policy-making, strongly influenced byGeor-
gian thought, to propose policies intended to curb rentier gains through different forms of
anti-trust laws, nationalization, and by taxing rents from “unearned” income such as capital
gains more severely than other forms of income (McGoey, 2017; Mazzucato, 2018).
ForKeynes, the “artificial” quality of this type of “scarcity-value”, the fact that legal and po-
litical conventions alone— rather than physical limits like land availability—made it possible
for rentiers to monopolize even something that had no fixed limits on it struck him as an even
more pernicious type of unearned gain than land rents. The illusory nature of financial rents,
the fact that they are generated from the ‘cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist’ rather
than a physical limit like land scarcity, made him confident that financial rents were likely to be
better curbed by governmental intervention in the future — a view that was bolstered by suc-
cessful efforts over the early twentieth century across western advanced industrial nations to
tame rentier power through various taxation and policy measures. In the UK, from the 1940s
to 1970s, as Christophers (2020) writes, “both financial and landed-property interests — the
dominant rentiers of the past—were effectively shackled” (p. 4). The “big 5”bankswere tightly
regulated by the state, which dictated liquidity requirements and lending prioritizes, andmany
companies came under public ownership, a pattern reversed in the 1980s (Millward, 1997).
In the US, marginal tax rates exceeded 70 percent on the top earners, a policy deliberately
imposed, as two leading economists of income inequality describe, to “constrain the immod-
erate, and especially unmerited, accumulation of riches” (Saez & Zucman, 2019). Today, al-
though there are growing proposals are growing increase taxes on the wealthy, endorsed most
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recently by the IMF (Inman, 2021), there hasn’t been, until very recently, nearly the same pub-
lic condemnation of rentier gains that prevailed in the early tomid-twentieth century. The very
idea of “unmerited” accumulation of wealth is far less common today than in the nineteenth
century, when “unearned” gains from both inherited wealth and gains from stock speculation
were widely held in disrepute, leading industrial magnates like Andrew Carnegie to lie about
having engaged in stock speculation, routinely denying having made money from the stock
market when really he had (Nasaw, 2006).
A curious transformation has taken place: rather than the rentier being euthanized, it is the
belief that rentiers exist that has disappeared, obliterated frommainstream economic theory—
extinguished as a core, central focus of analysis despite financial rents growing on a scale that
would have astonished Keynes.
Only a minority of economists in mainstream and heterodox traditions focus on the prob-
lem of rentier wealth. One of them is Mariana Mazzucato who argues that the wealthy are
often rewarded not for genuine value-creation but rather from extracting wealth from the pub-
lic. The way that “value” is taught in mainstream economics programmes and understood by
policy-makers helps to enable “value-extracting activities tomasquerade as value-creating activ-
ities” (Mazzucato, 2018, p. xviii).
Hudsonmakes a similar point, detailing shifts in economic theory that have led “unearned
income”— a key concept in the nineteenth and early twentieth century — to disappear from
economic thought, leading to destructive economic activity being accepted as “value-creation”
because it contributes to measurements of GDP and making nations appear wealthier even
when wealth is concentrated in fewer hands. Hudson sees the finance sector as acting like a
parasite on the “real” economy,withmanagers “squeezing out higher profits by downsizing and
outsourcing labor[…] In due course, the threat of bankruptcy is used towipe out or renegotiate
pensionplans, and to shift losses onto consumers and labor” (Bezemer&Hudson, 2016, p. 747;
see also Hudson, 2014 and Baker et al., 2018).
Renewed interest in rentier gains has grown in tandem with recognition that income in-
equality is worsening in nearly every nation globally (OECD, 2012). Books like Piketty’s Cap-
ital (2014) and Christophers’ Rentier Capitalism (2020) have placed inequality and the rents
that exacerbate it “squarely in the spotlight” (Christophers, 2020, p. xix). Piketty’s book is not
primarily focused on rentier wealth, but it helps to unbury the obscured role that rents play in
the economy by showing, much as the Lauderdale Paradox suggests, that private wealth often
drains rather than increases public wealth. It was not an entirely new argument, but rather
reinforced the message of earlier data he and colleagues had collected for decades (c.f. Piketty
& Saez, 2003). Scholars such as Lisa Keister have also raised similar concerns (Keister, 2005;
Hacker & Pierson, 2010). But Piketty’s book was a catalyst sparking wider interest in what
Keynes described as the “outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live[…] its
failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth
and incomes” (2017[1935], p. 323).
Piketty’s (2014) book compelled even the largest winners in today’s economy to acknowl-
edge that inequality is a problem, including Bill Gates. But there’s a key difference: Gates does
not concede that inequality is driven by rentier, exploitative gains. The remark fromGates that
I quote at the outset of this article comes fromhis reviewofPiketty’s book,where he agreeswith
Piketty on some points, but also criticizes what he calls “important flaws”— namely, Piketty’s
emphasis on rentier gains. Gates writes:
Contrary to Piketty’s rentier hypothesis, I don’t see anyone on the list whose an-
cestors bought a great parcel of land in 1780 and have been accumulating family
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wealth by collecting rents ever since. In America, that old money is long gone —
through instability, inflation, taxes, philanthropy, and spending (Gates, 2014).
Gates’s argument is questionable on two fronts. Firstly, he underestimates the role the
inherited wealth and other intergenerational transfer play in wealth concentration in the US
economy today, accounting for estimated 35 to 45 percent of all wealth in the nation, sharply
reinforcing racial and class-based forms of disadvantage (Feiveson & Sabelhaus, 2018; Pfeffer
& Killewald, 2018; Sawhill & Rodrigue, 2015).2 Secondly, even if he did acknowledge the
major role that inheritance plays in wealth divides today, his view would still be a narrow un-
derstanding of rent, because his definition is limited to inheritance from “old money”, rather
than rentier gains from patent protections, for example.
It’s not surprising that Gates would insist that most wealth today is not “rentier” in the
sense of being unearned wealth. His stance is characteristic of the mega-rich, reflecting a long-
standing tendency in different eras to insist that one’s accumulation is more ethical than earlier
generations, such as Carnegie’s tendency to lie about having made money from stock specula-
tion at a time when doing so was viewed disapprovingly by wider society, or John D. Rock-
efeller Sr’s insistence that his wealth “was a gift from God” while shielding himself from ev-
idence of worker exploitation at his mining camps. When called to testify before the Walsh
Committee on Industrial Relations held over 1913–1915, Rockefeller Sr said that the best way
to support workers was through “fair wages”, but when asked by the Committee chair, Frank
Walsh, whether hewas aware of his workmen’s complaints ofworking in dehumanizing, under-
paid conditions, Rockefeller Sr replied, “No sir. That would not come to me. That would be
a matter of detail that would come to the proper officials” (Walsh Commission, 2017[1916],
p. 8303; see also Arnove & Pinede, 2007).
Rockefeller’s son also testified. When questioned about the Ludlow Massacre of 1914,
where dozens of people died at the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, in-
cluding women and 11 children, Rockefeller Jr, like his father, professed to have no knowledge
of draconian, harsh management commands that gave rise to a strike, angering Walsh who ex-
claimed: “Is it a part of your plan not to learn or to even hear of these conditions?” (New
York Times, 1915). Both father and son insisted that wages andworking conditions were “fair”
andmorally defensible, while insulating themselves from any evidence otherwise—a recurring
pattern in modern industrial relations (McGoey, 2019).
Similarly today, when Gates insists, wrongly, that “old money” plays no significant role
in today’s economy, or when he restricts the definition of rent to land rents from inherited
estates, it’s not a surprising stance given that his own fortune grew from advantageous patent
protections and financial speculation that created artificial scarcity for wider society while his
own fortune mushroomed.
What is more surprising is agreement from the political left, leading to an unusual and
little-discussed epistemic alliance that requires more analytical attention. When left-wing
economists agree thatmany large fortunes today are not rentier in nature, it helps to legitimates
the absence of rentierism as an “objective” reality, rather than a self-invested perspective. In
epistemological terms, it confers an “ignorance alibi” on billionaire beneficiaries, helping them
to insist that a phenomenon does not exist, rather than being simply imperceptible by those
who have an incentive not to see it (McGoey, 2012 & 2019).
My final section explores the historical origins and the social implications of the see-sawing
visibility of rentier gains. Building on work by Hudson, Mazzucato and others, I explore the
2. Thanks to DTCochrane for a helpful suggestion here and additional reference suggestions.
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relationship between the marginalist turn in the late nineteenth century and the “vanishing”
of rent today. But I also highlight limitations in recent work on rentierism that scholars like
Mason have seized upon, leading to an impasse in understandings of rent that has important
but neglected epistemological and social implications.
3 The Rentier Carousel and Its Social Implications
What powers the rentier carousel, bringing different conceptions of rent into sight in different
periods? The answer is perceptions of economic value, and specifically shifting understand-
ings of value over the modern period. Classical political economists such as Smith, Ricardo
andMarx largely subscribed to a labour theory of value. Although Ricardo andMarx reached
starkly different normative conclusions, a starting point of labour theories was Smith’s argu-
ment that a commodity’s price reflected a combination of three “component parts”: wage, rent,
andprofit. AsVianello describes, Smithdescribes the components as “the three original sources
[…] of all exchangeable value” (Smith, 1997[1776], Vol. 1, quoted in Vianello, 1990, p. 233).
Smith (1997[1776]) writes inVol. 1 that “the natural price itself varies with the natural rate
of each of its component parts, of wages, profit and rent” (quoted in Vianello, 1990, p. 233).
This wording is sometimes misperceived as evidence that Smith belief that a commodity’s ex-
change value reflected a legitimate, “natural” rightful distribution to each component part. But
in reality, his Wealth of Nations extensively criticizes the efforts of merchant and landowner
classes to gouge the proportion received as profit or rent at the expense of returns to labourers,
encapsulated by Smith’s famous remark that “Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of
tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour.” Smith also per-
ceived an important point that I return to below: that the law plays a strong role in advantaging
wealthier classes. He made an insightful point, for example, about what would later come to
be called bargaining power, pointing out that the law unfairly favoured the owners of capital
over workers when it came to “combining” (forming in early versions of unions). As he put it,
there are “no acts of parliament against combining [with other merchants] to lower the price
of work; but many against combining to raise it” (Smith 1997[1776], p. 65).
At the turn of the twentieth-century, theories of economic value shifted away from the clas-
sical approach. The preoccupationwith how laws and acts of parliament affect the distribution
of income was side-lined by the “marginal turn” which reduced Smith’s stylized conception of
three central economic orders (landowners, merchants and labourers) to two general factors of
production: capital and labour, as well as a novel understanding of income distribution which
suggested that, in situations of “perfect competition”, the factors of production receive a dis-
tribution of income that is proportionate to the economic value they have contributed to the
production process.
Where did the shift come from? A number of late nineteenth century economists pio-
neered the rise of the marginalist turn in economic thought, including Alfred Marshall and
Léon Walras. But as Schumpeter, Stigler and Knight separately pointed out, the economist
most responsible for new attitudes to the “natural law” of income distribution was John Bates
Clark, an American economist whose influential book, The Distribution ofWealth (1899), de-
veloped a powerful defence of industrialist capital-owners at a timewhen bloody struggles over
income distribution were being waged in the factories and mine camps owned by Rockefeller,
Carnegie and other robber barons (Schumpeter, 1972[1954]; Stigler, 1980).
In an influential passage in The Distribution of Wealth, Clark (2012[1899]) suggests that
the
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distribution of the income of society is controlled by a natural law, and […] where
natural laws have their ways, the share of income that attaches to any productive
function is gauged by the actual product of it. In other words, free competition
tends to give to labor what labor creates, to capital what capital creates. (p. 3)
Ever since his theory emerged, economists on the left and the right have raised concerns
about its scientific legitimacy. Clark himself was clear that it was an idealized theory, reflecting
a stylized picture of income distribution that rarely applies in practice because the “frictions”
of imbalanced, real-life markets perverted any natural “law” from holding true (Morgan, 1993;
Stabile, 1995). Frank Knight was concerned about the “law” from a right-wing perspective be-
cause Knight feared that it would enable labourers to use union power to flaunt disproportion-
ate wage gains as legitimately earned (McGoey, 2017). But regardless of persistent criticism of
Clark’s “law” (Schumpeter, 1972[1954], for example, used scare quotes when he wrote about
it — to stress that it wasn’t really a law), variations of Clark’s formulation took hold in main-
stream economic theory, entrenching the spurious belief that one’s income “naturally” reflects
the economic contributionmade by the recipient. The notion of “excessive” income is drained
of themoral censure that Smith once attached to thewealthy reaping “where they never sowed.”
Today, near-identical wording to the exact phrasing that Clark used to describe the “natural”
law of income distribution is repeated bestselling macroeconomic undergraduate textbooks
— while Clark’s stipulations about market imperfections that prevent his theory from hold-
ing in practice are either accidentally or deliberately ignored. Gregory Mankiw, for example, a
long-standing Republican advisor, Harvard economist, and author of the bestselling textbook
Macroeconomics (2013b), describes income distribution this way in his textbook: “If all firms
in the economy are competitive and profit maximizing, then each factor of production is paid
its marginal contribution to the production process” (p. 55).
In a different text, Mankiw acknowledges that in the real world there are times when the
income distribution does not fairly reflect value contributions, such as when “a person’s high
income results from political rent-seeking rather than producing a valuable product.” But he
also adds a caveat, claiming that in capitalist nations such as the United States this type of ren-
tier gains are generally rare: “My own reading of the evidence is that most of the very wealthy
got that way by making substantial economic contributions, not by gaming the system or tak-
ing advantage of some market failure or the political process” (Mankiw, 2013a, p. 30; see also
McGoey, 2017).
This is a questionable point. Against Mankiw’s claim that rentier returns are rare in
advanced capitalist economies, scholars such as Hacker and Pierson (2010) have carried out
detailed empirical studies of legislative changes that have compounded returns to capital
at labour’s expense. Across most OECD countries, labour’s share of national income fell
considerably over the past three decades, a problem also growing more severe in emerging
major economies such as China (Burger, 2015; OECD, 2012). Today, as executive pay
skyrockets, more economists have begun to resuscitate mid-century concerns about the
legitimacy of standards economic theories of income distribution, reiterating concerns from
1950s and 1960s, when economists such as Joan Robinson saw marginal productivity as a
brazen tool of elite power, furnishing spurious legitimacy upon excessive rewards to capital
owners. “The dominance in neo-classical economic teaching of the concept of a production
function,” she wrote, “has been a powerful tool of miseducation” (Robinson 1953, p. 81).
Mazzucato has made the same point, pointing out that reasoning behind neoclassical in-
come distribution theories
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is circular, a closed loop. Incomes are justified by the production of something
that is of value. But how do we measure value? By whether it earns income. You
earn income because you are productive and you are productive because you earn
income. Sowith awave of a wand, the concept of unearned income vanishes (Maz-
zucato, 2018, p. 12).
The marginal turn has made it easier for economics as a discipline to side-line questions of
law and power in favour of idealized models of markets “as if” they were competitive (Moseley,
2012). As Katharina Pistor writes, over the twentieth century, capital accumulation owed “as
much to the state and its laws as its predecessors, only that this nexus is now denied” (2020,
p. 170). Contra the arguments of Mankiw, even mainstream economists such as Dani Ro-
drik —who accepts marginal productivity as a useful starting point — admit that it may have
thwarted more study of the role of political power, including political and legal factors such as
bargaining power and democratic rights, in increasing returns to labour or capital (Chu, 2016;
Rodrik, 1999). In a similar vein, Robert Solow (2017) has pointed out that it is difficult to
know precisely how disproportionate returns to capital are in today’s advanced economies, or
just how big a role that lobbying and other types of rent-seeking play in wealth gains, because
there is “no direct measurement of rent in this sense”.
In short, it’s not that economists don’t realize that marginal productivity theory is deeply
flawed — they do. The interesting question isn’t why its flaws aren’t more obvious, but why
it remains entrenched despite its flaws being so obvious. Many scholars within heterodox and
mainstream believe, as the economist Chris Dillow puts it, that “marginal product theory
doesn’t make much sense as an explanation of wage levels” (Dillow, 2017). But Dillow’s call
to “abandon it as mental model in favour of bargaining models” remains a minority view.
In epistemological terms, the theory’s lack of realism immunizes it from being conclusively
disproven. Take Mankiw’s wording quoted above: “If all firms in the economy are competi-
tive and profit maximizing, then each factor of production is paid its marginal contribution”
(emphases added).
The “if” in this sentence is an epistemological ace up the sleeve allowing the theory’s pro-
ponents to forever trump detractors by saying the theorymight be hypothetically true if other
usefully ambiguous criteria like sufficient “competitiveness” are satisfied. The inherent elastic-
ity of the axiommilitates against its own undermining. Meanwhile, returns to capital continue
to flow upwards while wages for the vast majority of workers stagnate or decline in real terms
— and not just any returns. According to standard economic theory, this upwards deluge is
“earned” wealth rather than “rentier” in nature. Why? Because standard economic theory says
so.
Critics of the “standard” position see the tautology at play, recognizing that if rent is unseen
in standard models, the problem might be attributable not to the inexistence of rent, but to
the narrowness of models for detecting it. As Christophers (2020) puts it, rentierism today is a
“much more important phenomenon to contemporary capitalism thanMarx or Keynes could
ever have imagined, and than mainstream economics allows” (p. xxvii).
And yet, even valuable work from Christopher and others has its limits, because it doesn’t
address a key epistemological conundrum: why is “rent” less visible today than in Keynes’s
time? Or Robinson’s? Or Marx’s? Take Mazzucato’s statement above, that “with a wave of a
wand, the concept of unearned income vanishes.” It’s a little misleading, skirting the question
of who gets to wave the wand, painting political struggles as inevitable or arbitrary rather than
traceable to different social causes and incentives.
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In contrast, I suggest that if most economists today across the political spectrum choose
not to or are simply unable to “see” or model rentierism, then their myopia has a social his-
tory. In earlier work (McGoey, 2019), I introduced the notion of “ignorance pathways” as a
conceptual device for charting the reasons why different societal absences are produced and
maintained. Building onmy earlier analyses of the social and economic uses of ignorance (Mc-
Goey 2007; 2012& 2017; see also Bacevic, 2020; Best, 2021; Gross &McGoey, 2015; Svetlova,
2021), the concept has the followingmeaning: if something is unknownor ignorable, what his-
torical “pathways” made it that way? “Ignorance pathways”, in short, can be defined as social
or historical explanations for how and why different phenomena come to be imperceptible in
the present. In this case, the absence that needs explaining is the relative invisibility of theories
of rent at the heart of the economicsmainstream. Why and howdid “rent” disappear? Myfinal
section engages this question.
4 Ignorance Pathways and the Sources of RentierMyopia
It is useful to think of “unknowns” less like an empty hole, and more like a river, where the
unseen is not inexistent, but rather imperceptible as a result of the rushing current, fed bymul-
tiple tributaries. To identify different “ignorance pathways” is to follow a river’s many tribu-
taries, while acknowledging that not all pathways or causes of the unknown can be typically
unearthed in a singular analysis. Below, I introduce two, interrelated pathways that I suggest
help to provide an analytical framework for understanding the epistemological vanishing of
“rent”. It’s not an exhaustive analysis. Other sources of rentier myopia, including shifts in na-
tional accounting techniques, are also relevant (Hudson, 2014). But conceptually, I suggest
the following framework offers at least a partial explanation for the disciplinary “vanishing” of
rent. I label the two ignorance pathways “periodization myopia” and “sectoral myopia”.
“Periodization myopia” can be defined as the tendency for blindspots to emerge as a result
of the effort to differentiate between different historical eras in a way that creates politically
expedient “useful unknowns” for different groups. When it comes to the perceptibility of ren-
tierism, this problem is visible in the tendency to treat “rent” in an evolutionary way, gradually
enlarging from a focus on land rents, to encompass also speculative financial rents, to mort-
gage and other debt rents in the present period — an approach that is analytically accurate in
ways, but also has epistemological disadvantages. Themain problem is it implies that land rents
alone were the chief and even the exclusive focus on scholars like Smith, deflecting attention to
Smith’s criticism of usury and different types of monopoly trade privileges, like exclusive oper-
ating charters to the East India Company. Smith’s condemnation of financial entitlements not
simply economic but alsomoral anddemocratic in nature: he saw it as a duty of the sovereign to
ensure that governmental protections did not fair particular groups discriminately, but rather
increased the wealth shared by a larger polity (see in particular Smith, 1997[1776], Book 4;
McGoey, 2019).
An evolutionary focus has fostered the mistaken impression that the primary concern of
classical economists lay in the type of rent (e.g. land-based), rather than the principle behind
it: the problem of unfair advantage and disproportionate gain at the expense of less powerful
groups, entrenched through tiered, unfair systems of law.
This might seem like a minor problem. Economics has obviously progressed considerably
since Smith’s time—why does it matter that his work is routinelymisrecognized? But the side-
lining of Smith’s insistence on the importance of government protections such as usury laws
has secondary efforts — the river of unknowns grows wider — when this displacement con-
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tributes towider ignorance surrounding the classical economists’ understandingof the relation-
ship between governments andmarkets. Take Pistor (2020), who doesmake good points, cited
above, about how twentieth-century economic theory obscures the “nexus” between law and
capital accumulation, but who also makes erroneous claims about early classical economists,
such as her statement that the
classic economists were caught in a yesteryear’s world in which value was thought
to be derived from the use-value ofmaterial things, or their substance, while ignor-
ing the actual operation of markets and businesses as well as the law. (p. 168)
This is simply not true. Smith and his peers were preoccupied by the relationship between
law and capital, they saw it as key to understanding the distribution of income. Pistor is hardly
alone in hermistaken understanding of classical economic thought; Stiglitz (2008) offers a sim-
ilar caricature of Smith in seeking to distinguish his own work on information asymmetry in
markets.
For Smith, the law was an intra-economic force, not extra-economic. His analysis was not
divergent from Pistor as she implies, but rather a precursor in the same vein. While their fail-
ure to see Smith’s emphasis on the law as intra-economic might seem trivial, I argue that the
cumulative weight of this type of “periodization myopia” creates durable “useful unknowns”
for other groups. For example, it eases the ability of economists in the tradition ofGordonTul-
lock, George Stigler, or AnneKrueger to attribute rent-seeking to extra-economic “distortions”
like regulatory capture, best remedied through minimizing regulations, while side-lining both
classical and contemporary perspectives on the value and necessity of governmental regulations
such as usury laws (Weingast, 2017; Hudson, 2014). It makes it easier to treat the law like a hat
that economists can take on and off when they want to, rather than a limb.
Although they do not use the term “periodization myopia”, left-leaning critics of recent
scholarship on rentier wealth have identified similar problems when it comes to historical, evo-
lutionary efforts to differentiate between industrial and post-industrial periods. I explained
earlier where the excerpt fromGates at the beginning of this article comes from, but not yet the
Mason quote. It comes from a conference debate betweenMason and the economist Michael
Hudson held in January 2021 and later uploaded to YouTube. Hudson has long been an as-
tute, early observer of the growth of rentier capitalismover recent decades. During their debate,
Mason agrees with some of Hudson’s points, acknowledging that finance has grown signifi-
cantly relative to other sectors in the past 40 years, thus compounding financial rents. But he
also, much like scholars in the “Capital is Power” (CASP) tradition, offers some important
criticisms ofHudson’s distinction between finance and the “real” economy (see also Cochrane,
2011 & 2020). Mason points out that the bifurcation between “finance” and the “real” econ-
omy risks legitimating and naturalizing exploitative aspects in non-financial sectors by making
finance the bogeyman of “bad” capitalism. AsMason sees it, Hudson attributes predatory and
exploitative aspects to finance in away thatmakes it seemas if the “objectionable features of cap-
italism stem from it not being capitalist enough” (Mason, 2021b). A separate criticism from
Mason is by emphasizing the power of finance today, Hudson marginalizes the centrality of
finance to the rise of industrial capitalism over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
These are good points. But at the same time, in challengingHudson’s views on the novelty
and spread of “rentier capitalism” in the current era, Mason’s own criticism reflects a different
type of blindspot — something that I term “sectoral myopia”. Mason opens himself up to
the same criticism that he makes of Hudson: he risks implying the “productive” aspects of the
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economy are less exploitative than finance when Mason upholds “productive” activities such
as retail sales as being less rentier in nature than financial extraction.
The problem of “sectoral myopia” is visible in the delineation that Mason makes between
passive rentiers and productive capitalists. “Looking at the Forbes 400 list of richest Ameri-
cans,” Mason (2021b) writes in a recent working paper,
it is striking how rare generalized financial wealth is, as opposed to claims on par-
ticular firms. Jeff Bezos (#1), Bill Gates (#2) and Mark Zuckerberg (#3) all gained
their wealth through control over newly created production processes, not via fi-
nancial claims on existing ones […] This runs against the idea of dominance by
rentiers or passive rent-extractors.
It is a statement that is similar to Gates’s (2014) remark: “I don’t see anyone on the [Forbes
400] list whose ancestors bought a great parcel of land in 1780 and have been accumulating
family wealth by collecting rents ever since”.
An article by Julio Huato (2016), an economist also based like Mason at CUNY, makes a
similar point, claiming that any reading of the Forbes wealth list show “that true ‘masters of the
universe’ are not the Blankfein, Dimon, Lewis, and Cohn types. No, in fact, the true ‘masters
of the universe’ are the Gates, Slim, Ellison, and Walton types”. Like Mason, Huato makes
an important point about finance, which is that it should not be upheld as uniquely parasitical
when, asHuato puts it, all “capital is parasitic, whether involved in productive pursuits or not.”
And yetHuato andMason both object to using a term like rentier to describe predationwithin
the so-called “productive” economy, limiting their definition of rentierism to passive financial
rentiers.
It is a curious position. While itmay be true that the primary source of the fortunes or retail
and software giants such asWalton andGates are not ultimately rooted in finance, this still begs
this question: does that mean it’s not rentier wealth? The answer depends on how rentiers are
defined and classified. Are rentiersmerely finance-based? If so, thenwhat about rentier returns
from property rights, both IP and land-based? Or from government procurement contracts,
as Christophers’s work (2020) has detailed? Mason and Huato both conflate rentierism with
finance and then uphold the wealth of “non-financial” elites at the top of wealth rankings to
suggest that rentierism is less pronounced than other economists insist that it is. But their non-
perception of “rentier” wealthwithin the fortune of Gates, Bezos or Carlos Slim reflects a type
of blind-spot itself: sectoral myopia stemming from the demarcation of “finance” versus “non-
financial” wealth.
To summarize, just as “periodization myopia” leads to blindspots, what I term “sectoral
myopia” also obscures recognition of the pervasiveness of rent from state-sanctioned monop-
olistic manufacturing and service exchanges today —- but through a different pathway. That
“pathway” is the problem of categorical distinctions between the finance realm and manufac-
turing and service sectors. Ironically, the same economists who aptly call attention to the limits
of such categorical distinctions in Hudson’s work don’t necessarily see how the very same cat-
egorical silos lead to overly narrow, billionaire-serving portraits of who counts as a “rentier”.
Their work contributes to the “disappearance” of rent just as the marginal turn in value the-
ory did over a century ago, but the erasure has different disciplinary origins, reflecting less the
legacy of John Bates Clark than that of Keynes, who perhaps did more than any other modern
economist to narrow perceptions of rentier gains to financial rents.
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5 Conclusion
By detailing unintentional but clear parallels in the thought of heterodox critics of capitalism
and proponents of capitalism, this article deepens understandings of rent, as well as contributes
new insight to sociological studies of “epistemic communities” or “thought collectives”, inLud-
wig Fleck’s sense. Most recent studies of economic thought collectives, while highly valuable,
have tended to focus on witting communities of actors who purposefully come together to
actively, if discreetly, transform ideological agendas (c.f. Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). There
are notable exceptions such as Hirschman and Popp Berman’s work on “cognitive infrastruc-
tures” in economics, which shows how economic reasoning can affect policies both consciously
and indirectly when the epistemic authority of economists is privileged over other professional
groups (Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014; see also Mkandawire, 2014). But arguably, there
remains a general presumption that the most influential shifts in consciousness tend to result
from purposeful action and alliance-building, diverting attention from the unintentional legit-
imacy that unwitting expert actors confer on other parties, forged in this case when academic
insistence about the negligible importance of rentier returns in today’s economy helps to vali-
date billionaire self-interests.
What I term “sectoral myopia” can unwittingly make Bezos or Gates’ fortune seem more
“earned” than, say, a hedge funder, helping to cement a powerful, even if spurious, moral hierar-
chy when it comes to perceptions of extreme wealth. This myopia is not an ineffectual absence
or a mere gap in knowledge. Rather it is a type of productive, complicit “useful unknown”
(McGoey, 2019), conferring legitimacy on Gates when he claims that he can’t “see” rentiers at
the top of wealth rankings. It is a type of erasure that strips economic theory of a language for
identifying excessive rentier returns from IP protections on software and pharmaceuticals even
as these types of rents grow. The larger the rentier elephant becomes, the harder it becomes to
acknowledge or describe it.
Terminological battles have pernicious policy implications. It is more difficult to tax, re-
claim, and redistribute rentier returns when the contentious “object” of scrutiny — in this
case rentier returns— is upheld as being something that does not exist. For the rentier to actu-
ally wane in power today, what might need to first be “euthanized” is the narrow equivalence
of rentierism with finance. Until that perceptual shift takes place, an unwitting “epistemic al-
liance” between uber-capitalists and their staunchest critics is likely to persist, enabling today’s
wealthiest rentiers to convincingly deny that they deserve such a label. The rentier fades from
view while the rentier carousel spins faster than ever.
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